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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
However, because the Sound Recording Act of 1971 prohibits the
unauthorized duplication of works "fixed" after February 15, 1972, states
may perceive no need to enact such provisions." This is so because the
pirate industry concentrates on recently released, fast-selling works, which
do not retain their popularity; such practices are now proscribed by federal
law and the states need do nothing more to deter the pirate. Substantial
questions may arise, however, if Congress fails to renew the protection
of the Act which expires, under its own terms, on January 1, 1975 and
the states then choose to provide the missing protection. In such a case,
failure to renew may be taken as an affirmative indication of a congressional
intent to allow recordings to remain unprotected and the argument that
the states' power to regulate in the area had been preempted would be
persuasive.
Beyond the narrow issue of tape piracy, however, the decision, with
its emphasis on local importance, reflects a mood of the Court and portends
a trend away from the expansion of federal power witnessed during the
Warren Court years. In fact, when viewed with such recent decisions as
Miller v. California,s1 Goldstein evidences a tendency to allow local .tu-
thorities control over matters of "local importance" formerly thought to be
the sole province of the federal government.
Joseph H. Huston, Jr.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - STANDING - THE "ZONE OF INTEREST"
TEST OF Data Processing HELD INAPPLICABLE TO PLAINTIFF'S
STANDING IN A SUIT BETWEEN PRIVATE PARTIES.
American Postal Workers Union v. Independent Postal
System of America, Inc. (6th Cir. 1973)
The American Postal Workers Union1 brought an action seeking to
enjoin delivery of newspapers and magazines by the Independent Postal
System of America, Inc.2 Plaintiff based its action on the alleged repug-
nance of such practices to the constitutional provision conferring a mo-
80. See note 41 supra.
81. 413 U.S. 51 (1973). The Court in Miller prescribed that "contemporary
community standards" were to control the interpretation of "obscenity."
1. The union, an AFL-CIO affiliate, represented employees in the United States
Postal Service in the metropolitan Detroit area. American Postal Workers Union v.
Independent Postal Sys. of America, Inc., 481 F.2d 90, 91 (6th Cir.), cert. granted,
42 U.S.L.W. 3358 (U.S. Dec. 17, 1973) (No. 73-532).
2. The Independent Postal System of America was an Oklahoma corporation
engaged in the private postal business of delivering addressed magazines and news-
papers in numerous localities throughout the country. The individual defendants had
obtained a franchise from the corporation. American Postal Workers Union v.
Independent Postal Sys. of America, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 1297, 1298 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
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nopoly upon the United States Government to carry and deliver mail,
and the private express statutes4 enacted pursuant thereto. The district
court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis
that plaintiff lacked standing to sue.5 On appeal, plaintiff contended that
it had standing under the criteria established by the Supreme Court in
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp., The
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the grant
of summary judgment holding that the standing test of Data Processing
had no relevance to a suit between private parties, but applied only to
challenges to governmental action.7 American Postal Workers Union v.
Independent Postal System of America, Inc., 481 F.2d 90 (6th Cir.),
cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3358 (U.S. Dec. 17, 1973) (No. 73-532).
The doctrine of standing to sue8 in the federal courts has its founda-
tion in article III, section 2 of the Constitution which limits federal juris-
diction to "cases" or "controversies. " The Supreme Court has inter-
preted this constitutional provision in part as limiting the jurisdiction of
the federal courts to those cases in which the plaintiff has a sufficient
interest in the outcome of the controversy to assure an adversary presenta-
tion of the issues.10 Standing focuses on whether the plaintiff is the proper
party to request adjudication of the issues,"- and the constitutional re-
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
4. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1693-99, 1724 (1970). See note 22 infra. Defendants conceded
that the materials involved were "letters" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1696
(1970). 481 F.2d at 92. For a discussion of the applicable regulations and law in a
similar case which reached an opposite conclusion, see National Ass'n of Letter Car-
riers v. Independent Postal Sys. of America, 336 F. Supp. 804, 808-09 (W.D. Okla.
1971), aff'd, 470 F.2d 265 (10th Cir. 1972).
5. 349 F. Supp. 1297, 1299. The district court also held that no private right
of action existed under the private express statutes. Id.
6. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). See text accompanying note 18 infra for the substance
of these criteria.
7. The court also held that no private right of action existed under the pro-
visions relied on by plaintiff. See note 31 infra.
8. Much has been written on the law of standing. See, e.g., 3 K. DAvIs,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22 (1958, Supp. 1970); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS ch. 12-13 (1965) ; Albert, Standing to Chal-
lenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83
YALE L.J. 425 (1974); Dugan, Standing to Sue: A Commentary on Injury in Fact,
22 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 256 (1971) ; Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court - A
Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645 (1973).
It is evident from the following excerpt that difficulties are to be encoun-
tered in any examination of the law of standing:
Standing has been called one of the most amorphous concepts in the entire
domain of the public law ...
The law of standing as developed by the Supreme Court has become an area
of incredible complexity. Much that the Court has written appears to have been
designed to supply retrospective satisfaction rather than future guidance. The
Court itself has characterized its law of standing as a "complicated specialty of
federal jurisdiction."
Scanwell Laboratories v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (citations
omitted).
9. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (upholding taxpayer's standing to
challenge federal educational appropriations to religious and sectarian schools).
10. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
11. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968).
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quirement is satisfied when the plaintiff has been injured in fact, eco-
nomically or otherwise, by the challenged action.' 2
In addition to the injury in fact test for establishing standing, the
Supreme Court has adopted rules of self-restraint not required by the
Constitution.'8  The Court's decision in Data Processing substantially
liberalized its prior rule of self-restraint which had required that the plain-
tiff assert a legal right. 14  The petitioners in Data Processing, in the
business of selling data processing services, challenged a ruling by the
Comptroller of the Currency which provided that, as an incident to
banking services, national banks could make data processing services avail-
able to other banks and bank customers. Petitioners attempted to estab-
lish standing under section 4 of the Bank Service Corporation Act of
1962, which provided in relevant part: "No bank service corporation may
engage in any activity other than the performance of bank services for
banks."' 5 The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing
to sue1 6 because the petitioners had been unable to demonstrate the exist-
12. See Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 172 (1970) (Brennan & White, JJ.,
concurring in the result and dissenting). This opinion also applied to Association
of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), decided the
same day.
13. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953). See generally E. BARRETT
& P. BRUTON, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 58-149 (4th ed. 1973), for a discussion of these
court-made rules.
14. The legal right doctrine required, where a statute was relied upon, that the
statute contain either an express right to sue or reflect an intent to protect the
plaintiff's interests. See, e.g., Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 125 (1940)(plaintiff denied standing to secure review of erroneous statutory interpretation in
absence of statute providing a legal right) ; The Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258(1924) (standing found where interest intended to be protected).
In Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939), a case charac-
teristic of the legal right genre, 18 corporations sought to enjoin the operation of
the TVA on the grounds of its alleged unconstitutionality. The Supreme Court
denied standing, holding that one threatened with injury by governmental action
could not challenge that action "unless the right invaded is a legal right, - one of
property, one arising out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or one
founded on a statute which confers a privilege." Id. at 137. Despite criticism of
Tennessee Electric, see 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22.04, at 217-18
(1958), it firmly entrenched the legal right test in the federal law of standing.
Professor Davis made the following comment on the efficacy of this doctrine:
A plaintiff who seeks to challenge governmental action has standing if a
legal right of the plaintiff is at stake. When a legal right of the plaintiff is not
at stake, a plaintiff sometimes has standing and sometimes lacks standing.
Circular reasoning is very common, for one of the questions asked in order to
determine whether a plaintiff has standing is whether the plaintiff has a legal
right, but the question whether the plaintiff has a legal right is the final con-
clusion, for if the plaintiff has standing, his interest is a legally-protected
interest, and that is what is meant by a legal right.
Id. at 217.
For a discussion of the evolution of the legal right doctrine, see Comment,
The Congressional Intent to Protect Test: A Judicial Lowering of the Standing
Barrier, 41 U. CoLo. L. REv. 96, 99-103 (1969). For a discussion of the legal right
doctrine in a context other than competitor suits, see Note, Federal Judicial Review
of State Welfare Practices, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 84, 124-29 (1967).
15. 12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1970).
16. 279 F. Supp. 675, 678 (D. Minn. 1968), aff'd, 406 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1969),
rev'd, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
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ence of a personal legal right.17 On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that
petitioners had standing, and specifically rejected the legal right test:
The "legal interest" test goes to the merits. The question of
standing is different. It concerns, apart from the "case" or "contro-
versy" test, the question whether the interest sought to be protected by
the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected
or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question."8
In National Association of Letter Carriers v. Independent Postal
System of America,19 a case presenting facts and issues substantially
identical to those in the instant case, the plaintiff postal union sought to
enjoin the entry of the Independent Postal System into the postal business.
The Tenth Circuit applied the zone of interest test of Data Processing
and granted the plaintiff standing.20
The plaintiff in the instant case also sought to establish standing to
sue by reliance upon the Data Processing test. Injury in fact was alleged
to exist because the defendant's operation "imperiled the livelihood,
careers, annuities, benefits and guaranteed employment of the postal em-
ployees" represented by plaintiff. 21 To satisfy the second prong of the
Data Processing test, plaintiff alleged that the interests of the postal
workers were "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or
regulated" by article I, section 8, clause 7 of the Constitution which creates
a monopoly in the federal government "To establish Post offices and post
Roads," and the private express statutes.22 The Sixth Circuit refused to
17. Id. The legal right doctrine would have required the plaintiff to demon-
strate, in addition to the constitutional requirement of injury in fact, a legal right
to be free of competition.
18. 397 U.S. at 153 (emphasis added).
19. 470 F.2d 265 (10th Cir. 1972).
20. Id. at 270. The court first looked to Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727
(1972), and concluded that the plaintiff's members had the personal stake in the con-
troversy required by that case. 470 F.2d at 270. The court relied on the trial court's
determination that injury would result to plaintiff's 200,000 members from defendant's
operation in the form of significant loss of work time, overtime, employment oppor-
tunities, future pension and insurance benefits and in morale. Id. The court then
turned to Data Processing as an alternative test, and concluded that the postal
workers were arguably within the zone to be protected by the postal laws. The
analysis of the circuit court was brief. The opinion of the district court was more
complete, and is essentially that found in the text accompanying notes 38 & 40 infra.
21. 481 F.2d at 92.
22. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1693-99, 1724 (1970) ; 39 U.S.C. § 601 (1970). Essentially
these provisions provide criminal penalties for the carrying of mail in violation of the
United States postal monopoly. The court's analysis focused on only one of these
provisions, 18 U.S.C. § 1696(a) (1970), which provides in pertinent part:
Whoever establishes any private express for the conveyance of letters or
packets, or in any manner causes or provides for the conveyance of the same by
regular trips or at stated periods over any post route which is or may be estab-
lished by law, or from any city, town, or place, between which the mail is regu-
larly carried, shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than
six months, or both.
Id.
Plaintiff contended that certain provisions of the Postal Reorganization Act
of 1970, 39 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (1970), expressed a congressional concern for the
welfare of postal employees, thus placing them within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated by the private express statutes. Section 101 (c), an expression
[VOL. 19
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recognize standing under these provisions, and rejected the analysis of the
Letter Carriers case, holding that Data Processing was not controlling in
a suit between private parties, but had relevance only where the action
challenged was that of a governmental agency.23
The basis of the court's conclusion that the zone of interests test was
inapplicable to the instant facts was that neither Data Processing nor the
cases cited therein involved controversies between private parties. The
court sought support from Solien v. Miscellaneous Drivers & Helpers
Union24 and Colligan v. Activities Club, Ltd.,25 both of which purportedly
held that Data Processing was inapplicable where only private parties
were concerned.2 6 In Solien the Eighth Circuit concluded that Data Pro-
cessing was not controlling on the issue of the standing of a charging
party in a National Labor Relations Board case to obtain appellate review
of a judicial order in a proceeding under section 10(l) of the National
Labor Relations Act.27  That court characterized Data Processing as
"[presenting] the question of what interest one must allege in order to
establish that he is sufficiently aggrieved by an administrative order to be
entitled to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act .. .
of [an] adverse agency action." 28
While the holding of Solien buttressed the Sixth Circuit's position,
reliance upon Colligan may have been misplaced. The Colligan case in-
volved an attempt by consumers to establish standing under the Lanham
Trade-Mark Act 29 in order to enjoin deceptive advertising by a tour
of postal policy, provides that compensation in the postal service should be comparable
to that paid in the private sector, and that emphasis should be placed on opportunities
for career advancement for postal employees; section 1001 provides for the establish-
ment of procedures to guarantee protection of employment rights of the postal
workers; and sections 1201-09 are concerned with employee-management agreements.
The Sixth Circuit did not discuss these sections, but the district court determined
that the policy reflected in them would not override the public policy against enforce-
ment of criminal statutes by private parties. 349 F. Supp. at 1299.
23. 481 F.2d at 92.
24. 440 F.2d 124 (8th Cir. 1971).
25. 442 F.2d 686 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
26. In a footnote the court expressed the view that cases involving a constitu-
tional challenge to state law or state action in which standing under Data Processing
was found were "obviously without application." 481 F.2d at 92 n.2. See, e.g., Crossen
v. Breckenridge, 446 F.2d 833 (6th Cir. 1971); Moyer v. Nelson, 324 F. Supp. 1224(S.D. Iowa 1971).27. 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1970). This provision requires the Board Regional
Director to petition for injunctive relief to remedy certain unfair labor practices. Id.
Petitioner sought to intervene in the injunction proceeding with full party status, but
was relegated to the status of participant with a limited right of appearance at the
district court's hearings. 440 F.2d at 132.
28. 440 F.2d at 132 (emphasis in original).
29. Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.). Section 43(a) of the Act provides in pertinent part:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or sue in connection with any goods
or services . ... a false designation of origin, or any false description or repre-
sentation .... and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce ...
shall be liable to a civil action . . .by any person who believes that he is or is
likely to be damaged by the use of such false description or representation.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1970). Prior to Colligan the Act had been applied almost
exclusively to competitor suits. See 72 COLUM. L. REV. 182, 183 (1973). The Colligan
court, disregarding some legislative history which indicated an intent to protect
consumers, refused to judicially expand the scope of coverage. Id. at 186.
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agency. Contrary to the implication given by the American Postal
Workers court, the Colligan court did apply the Data Processing test,
but determined that the interests of the deceived plaintiffs were not "with-
in the zone of interests to be protected" by the Lanham Act.3 0
Having arrived at the conclusion that Data Processing did not pro-
vide the appropriate standing test, the Sixth Circuit might have proceeded
to determine what criteria did apply. However, the court declined the
opportunity to fashion guidelines for determining standing in such cases,
and instead settled upon an alternative ground for affirming the grant of
summary judgment by the district court.3 '
An understanding of the significance of the holding of the instant
case requires a comparison of the result that would obtain under the legal
right doctrine with the probable result if Data Processing were found
applicable. To demonstrate a legal right under the facts of American
Postal Workers, plaintiff would be required to show that the postal statutes
either conferred a privilege to sue, or evidenced a statutory intent to pro-
tect the plaintiffs. 32 The Sixth Circuit expressed the view that the postal
statutes had not been enacted for the protection of a class which included
30. 442 F.2d at 691. The American Postal Workers court implied, by its reliance
on Colligan for the proposition that Data Processing was inapplicable in a suit
between private parties, that Colligan did not apply the Data Processing test. This
interpretation may have resulted from the statement in Colligan that Data Processing
"does not bring these appellants under its protective wing." Id. For the view that
the Data Processing test was indeed utilized in Colligan, see 72 COLUm. L. REv. 182,
187 (1972), wherein it was also noted that the Data Processing test was not strictly
applicable. Id. at 187 n.37.
31. 481 F.2d at 93. The court held that the private express statutes involved
did not provide a private right of action under the general rule that such an action is
not maintainable under a criminal statute. Id. The concepts of standing, private
right of action, and jurisdiction are closely related and often overlap in application.
See, e.g., National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers,
42 U.S.L.W. 4132, 4137 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
The Sixth Circuit distinguished cases such as J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426 (1964), in which an implied private cause of action for violation of a
criminal statute was found. In Borak, the plaintiffs were clearly members of the
public designed to be protected by the relevant statute, while in the instant case the
court believed that it could not be "seriously contended that the Private Express
Statute was enacted for the protection of a class which included the postal employees
or a union representing them." 481 F.2d at 93. The Letter Carriers court also faced
this issue. There the Tenth Circuit found that the plaintiff-postal workers' interests
fell within the class which the private express statutes were designed to protect. 470
F.2d at 270-71. Relying on this finding, the court concluded both that the zone of
interest test of Data Processing had been satisfied, and that the statute provided a
private right of action. Id. It should be recognized that the Tenth Circuit approach
effected a merger of the standing and private right of action doctrines on these facts.
The Tenth Circuit held that the general rule with respect to denial of injunctive
relief against violation of a criminal statute to be of "no moment" where property
rights of an economic nature were threatened. Id. at 271. Additionally, the court
stated that because civil as well as criminal provisions were involved, there existed
a second rationale for finding a cause of action. These statutes, 39 U.S.C. §§ 601, 604
(1970), seem inapposite to the question of standing or the existence of a private right
of action. Section 601 provides for a limited situation in which "letters" can be
carried out of the mail. Section 604 permits certain officials involved in the inspection
of postal materials to seize those materials which are being carried contrary to law.
32. See note 14 supra.
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the postal employees or a union representing them.33 Under' this view,
no legal right would exist and plaintiff would be denied standing to sue.34
Arguably, application of the zone of interest test of Data Processing
would lead to the conclusion that plaintiff did have standing.3 5 The
Supreme Court made it clear in Data Processing that the existence of a
legal right was not to be inquired into - that question went to the merits.
The Data Processing standard requires only that plaintiff's interests be
"arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated." 36
This has been construed by at least one commentator to mean that an
intention to protect may be found where a statutory limitation is favorable
to the interest of the class seeking- review.37 The interest sought to be
protected in American Postal Workers was the employment of the plain-
tiff's members in the Postal Service.3 8 The constitutional and statutory
provisions limiting competition were clearly favorable to that interest.
Additionally, more affirmative proof of intent to protect was available to
the court as evidenced in the district court opinion in the Letter Carriers
case. While the primary purpose of the constitutional and statutory pro-
hibitions was to promote an efficient postal operation, a secondary purpose
could be found in related postal statutes relied upon by the plaintiff.39
These provisions, which regulated employment opportunities and attempted
to insure the economic security of the postal workers, expressed a con-
gressional intent to protect those interests. 40 Even if this inferred intent
to protect would not meet the rigorous legal right standard, it should
have satisfied the liberal zone of interest test. Thus the significance of the
Sixth Circuit's position is that it could operate to deny a plaintiff an
opportunity to assert a claim against a private party for the same injury
for which a claim would be heard under Data Processing if the actor were
an administrative agency.
Analysis of the context in which Data Processing's immediate con-
ceptual predecessors were decided indicates that the Sixth Circuit's limited
reading of that case was justified. The treatment of standing by the
Supreme Court as well as the lower federal courts has focused almost
33. 481 F.2d at 93. The court's statement referred to the question of whether a
private right of action existed under the private express statutes, but as the concepts
of "private right of action" and "legal right" are similar, the statement can be taken
as the court's probable view on the existence or non-existence of a legal right. For
the basis of this analysis, see note 31 supra.
34. Conceivably, the court could have found a legal interest, not by way of
statutory protection per se, but by analogy to cases in which a legal right was found
based on the grant of a public charter to the complaining competitor. See, e.g., Frost
v. Corporation Comm'n, 278 U.S. 515 (1929) (franchise granted by state constituted
a property right within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment). The public
charter cases and others involving competitors are exhaustively treated in Annot.,
90 A.L.R.2d 7 (1963).
35. Of course, this is exactly what the Tenth Circuit held in the Letter Carriers
case.
36. 397 U.S. at 153. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
37. See Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARV. L. REv. 633, 634 (1971).
38. 336 F. Supp. at 806.
39. Id.
40. Id. See note 22 supra for a discussion of the relevant statutory provisions.
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exclusively on standing to challenge governmental illegality, and, very
frequently, on standing to seek judicial review of administrative action.41
The emergence of the law of standing in the realm of administrative law
was necessarily influenced by the public policy of encouraging govern-
mental responsiveness, 42 and was shaped by the congressional intent
embodied in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) .4 These factors
were largely responsible for the evolution of the legal right theory into
the test of Data Processing." This evolution can be traced by examining
three categories of cases: (1) "private attorney general" cases, (2) cases
which held that a legal right was required under the APA, and (3) cases
which held that a legal right was not required under the APA.
In the "private attorney general" cases standing to challenge govern-
mental action was upheld despite the absence of a legal right. These
cases were distinguished by the presence of an express "person aggrieved"
provision in the relevant statute. The leading case was FCC v. Sanders
41. Standing to seek review of administrative action is a sub-category of the
broader law of standing to challenge governmental action which also includes chal-
lenges to illegal legislative action, such as taxpayer attacks on spending provisions
and reapportionment issues. Recent cases in this area have significantly enlarged the
scope of governmental action which can be challenged, by liberalization of standing
rules. The Supreme Court has moved from the narrow view of Frothingham v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (denying standing to taxpayers contesting federal appro-
priations for maternal and infant care), to the present view announced in Flast
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (upholding taxpayer's standing to challenge federal
educational appropriations to religious and sectarian schools). See Tucker, The
Metamorphosis of the Standing to Sue Doctrine, 17 N.Y.L.F. 911, 911-20 (1972).
This trend towards judicial activism through liberalization of standing requirements
is also found in administrative law. See notes 42-43 infra.
42. Administrative agencies play an ever increasing role in the regulation of all
aspects of daily life. See Rogge, An Overview of Administrative Due Process, 19
VILL. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1973). In order for this role to be effectively and fairly per-
formed, access to judicial review is essential, and a liberal approach to standing is
necessary to achieve this goal. See Tucker, supra note 41, at 921. As with challenges
to illegal legislative action (see note 41 supra), the trend has been from judicial
abstention to judicial activism. See Tucker, supra note 41, at 921-22. Compare
Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. United States, 263 U.S. 143 (1923) (denying
plaintiff without a legal interest standing to challenge ultra vires agency action), with
Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
43. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1970). The APA has been construed to preserve the
availability of judicial review unless Congress clearly has expressed an intent to
preclude such review:
The legislative material elucidating that seminal Act [the APA] manifests a
congressional intention that it cover a broad spectrum of administrative actions,
and this Court has echoed that theme by noting that the [APA's] "generous
review provisions" must be given a "hospitable" interpretation.
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967) (citations omitted)
(upholding pre-enforcement review of drug regulations). See Tucker, supra note 41,
at 923. It should be recognized that reviewability and standing are separate and dis-
tinct concepts. In administrative review cases, standing may exist while judicial review
is nevertheless foreclosed. This dichotomy is apparent in the analysis followed by the
Supreme Court in Data Processing - once standing was found to exist, the Court
proceeded to determine whether agency review had been foreclosed. 397 U.S. at 153-58.
Under the Court's view the review provision of the APA is in 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1970),
which provides generally that judicial review is authorized "except to the extent that -
(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency
discretion by law." Id. For the substance of the APA's standing provision, see text
accompanying note 50 infra.
44. See Tucker, supra note 41, at 923-26.
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Brothers Radio Station" in which the Supreme Court granted standing
to a plaintiff who was unable to demonstrate the infringement of a personal
legal right. This seemingly anomalous result was apparently attributable
to an express statutory provision for judicial review which the Court
found applicable. 46 Subsequent cases in this category were consistent with
Sanders,47 and the rationale advanced for standing without a legal right
where the relevant statute provided for judicial review was that "these
private citizens have standing only as representatives of the public in-
terest," 48 i.e., as "private attorneys general.."49
In 1946, after the legal right and public interest doctrines were estab-
lished, Congress enacted the APA. The standing provision of the APA,
section 10(a), provides:
Any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency action,
or adversely affected by such action within the meaning of any rele-
vant statute, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof. 0
It appears that, based on the Sanders doctrine, the legal right doctrine would
be inoperative in cases involving this provision. However, while section 10
was eventually to have a substantial impact on the law of standing,51 initially
it was interpreted by the courts as merely reflective of existing law. 52
In 1970, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, relying on section 10 of the APA, abandoned the legal right
requirement. In Scanwell Laboratories v. Shaffer,53 that court upheld a
plaintiff's standing to challenge alleged illegality by the Federal Aviation
Administration in letting a contract to a competitor. The plaintiff, denied
standing in the district court, sought to obtain review under section 10 of
the APA. The court held that a legal right was not required under sec-
45. 309 U.S. 470 (1940). Petitioners in Sanders challenged the grant of a license
to a new broadcasting station.
46. See K. DAVIS, supra note 14, at 221; Scanwell Laboratories v. Shaffer, 424
F.2d 859, 863 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Section 402(b) (2) of the Communications Act of
1934, ch. 652, § 402(b) (2), 48 Stat. 1093 (1934), as amended 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (6)(1970), bestowed standing on persons "aggrieved or whose interests are adversely
affected" by Commission action. For additional statutes containing such provisions,
see K. DAvIs, supra note 14, § 22.03, at 213-16.
47. See, e.g., Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942).
48. Id. at 14.
49. This rationale was explained in Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694
(2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943):
Congress can constitutionally enact a statute conferring on any non-official
person, or on a designated group of non-official persons, authority to bring a suit
to prevent action by an officer in violation of his statutory powers; . . . even if
the sole purpose is to vindicate the public interest. Such persons, so authorized,
are, so to speak, private Attorney Generals (sic).
Id. at 704. In the absence of the necessary "person aggrieved" statute, the "private
attorney general" rationale is inapplicable to American Postal Workers.
50. 5 U.S.C. § 702(a) (1970).
51. See Tucker, supra note 41, at 923.
52. Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955) ; accord, Rural Electrification Administration v. Northern
States Power Co., 373 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1962).
53. 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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tion 10.54 While recognizing that the Supreme Court had not yet held
that the APA negated this requirement, 5 the court nevertheless found
that the trend of the cases interpreting the APA,56 and its legislative
history,57 justified such a broad reading. The import of Scanwell to the
analysis of American Postal Workers is that Scanwell demonstrates that
the catalyst which moved the District of Columbia Circuit from the legal
right doctrine to injury in fact as the only test of competitor standing was
section 10 of the APA. Since section 10 is only available in administrative
actions, not suits between private parties, it could not have served as a
foundation for a liberal standing test in American Postal Workers.
Data Processing also utilized section 10 as the bridge to span the
gap between the legal right test and the more liberal zone of interests
test, although the Data Processing Court did not make that entirely clear. 58
However, language in a subsequent Supreme Court decision, Sierra Club
v. Morton,50 indicated that Data Processing was indeed an interpretation
of the APA standing provision as well as a formulation of the constitu-
tional case-and-controversy requirement:
Early decisions under [section 10 of the APA] interpreted the
language as adopting the various formulations of "legal interest" and
"legal wrong" then prevailing as constitutional requirements of stand-
ing. But, in [Data Processing] we held more broadly that persons had
standing to obtain judicial review of federal agency action under § 10
of the APA where they had alleged that the challenged action had
caused them "injury in fact," and where the alleged injury was to an
interest "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regu-
lated" by the statutes that the agencies were claimed to have violated. 60
54. Id. at 872.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1970). The court
found Abbott Laboratories to be indicative of the "hospitable" view which the Supreme
Court took of section 10. 424 F.2d at 872. While the statements from Abbott Labora-
tories (see note 43 supra) were actually made in the context of reviewability, the
case nevertheless indicates the Court's intent to construe section 10 broadly. Cf. K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22.00-5, at 727 (Supp. 1970). The Scanwell
court also relied heavily on Sanders, stating that the only difference between that
case and those requiring a legal right was the express statutory provision in Sanders
granting judicial review. Based on this distinction, the court concluded that:
[T]he "legal right" doctrine is certainly dead wherever there is express "person
aggrieved" language in the relevant statute, and there is a strong argument for
the proposition that the same result should obtain when section 10 of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act applies.
424 F.2d at 863.
57. The legislative history of section 10 is the basis of the current controversy
over whether that provision requires merely a showing of injury in fact, or requires
in addition proof of a statutory intent to protect. Data Processing adopted the latter
view. However, Justices Brennan and White argued convincingly for the adoption of
injury in fact as the sole requirement of standing under section 10. Barlow v.
Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 177-78 (1970) (Brennan & White, JJ., concurring in the
result and dissenting). The commentators are split. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, supra
note 56, § 22.00-5; Dugan, supra note 7; Jaffe, supra note 37, at 6.36.
58. The Court's discussion of the APA focused on reviewability. 397 U.S. at
156-57. There is but one cryptic reference to section 10, following the language setting
forth the zone of interest test. Id. at 153.
59. 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (denying standing to environmental organization where
no injury in fact had been alleged).
60. Id. at 733 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The above analysis demonstrates that the zone of interests test
evolved in the context of administrative law, and that it is at least in part
an interpretation of the APA. However, the question of whether the test
could nevertheless be applied where only private parties are involved
remains. Any requirement beyond injury in fact is not a constitutional
necessity, and for this reason courts have some leeway in determining
what rule of self-restraint, if any, should apply in a particular category
of cases.01 The District of Columbia Circuit recently employed this ap-
proach in Potomac Passengers Association v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry.62
That appeal presented, in part, the question of whether an association of
passengers had standing to seek injunctive relief against violations of the
Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970.63 At the outset the court was con-
fronted with a situation analogous to that found in American Postal
Workers. The applicable standing doctrines had developed solely in the
context of determining who could challenge governmental action, but the
defendant Amtrak was not an agency or instrumentality of the federal
government. 64 After noting that Data Processing was at least in part an
interpretation of the standing requirements under the APA,65 the court
framed the issue as follows: Should the Data Processing test govern
standing to sue a corporation that was neither an agency of the federal
government nor subject to the APA ?66 The court concluded that it should
since the rationale for liberal standing requirements in the area of adminis-
trative law - insuring the integrity of federal regulatory programs -
extended to government created corporations. 67
It is questionable whether the Sixth Circuit could have pointed to a
public policy rationale, similar to that found in Potomac Passengers, to
justify application of a liberal standing test. The action in American
Postal Workers was not brought against an organization of a public nature
as in Potomac Passengers. However, it could be argued that the public
interest in an efficient postal system would preclude encroachment upon
the United States postal monopoly by the Independent Postal System.
61. See the discussion with respect to the controversy over whether a rule of
self-restraint is necessary under section 10, note 57 supra.
62. 475 F.2d 325 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd sub norn., National R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 42 U.S.L.W. 4132 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1974)
(No. 72-1289). The Supreme Court's recent decision reversing Potomac Passengers
does not affect the significance of the textual discussion of that case. The Court's
reversal was couched in terms of an absence of a right of action rather than standing.
The Court did not speak to the circuit court's application of Data Processing.
63. 45 U.S.C. §§ 501 et seq. (1970). This legislation is commonly referred to
as the Amtrak Act. Appellants contended that the procedure followed in the discon-
tinuance of certain lines violated sections 404(a) and 802 of the Amtrak Act. 45
U.S.C. §§ 564(a), 642 (1970).
64. 475 F.2d at 329. The Amtrak Act specifically so provides. See 45 U.S.C.
§ 541 (1970).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 330.
67. Id. The court also noted that the corporation was in fact "quasi-public"
because, inter alia, the President appoints a majority of the board of directors, the
initial financing came from the United States Treasury, and government guaranteed
bonds continue to finance it. Id.
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A concomitant of such interference might be a reduction in both postal
revenues and employee morale, leading to a drop in the quality of service.
On the other hand, however, the public interest might be served by
competition - reduction in revenues might be negligible, and the efforts
of the Postal System might be stimulated by improvements in postal
service pioneered by competitors. The effect of denying standing was to
leave this question of whether competition in the postal business did or
did not serve the public interest in the hands of the Attorney General.
The split between the Sixth and Tenth Circuits might best be ex-
plained by recognizing the policy considerations evinced by the two courts.
The Sixth Circuit saw no substantial harm to the plaintiff (at one point
the court suggested that the harm was de minimis and for that reason
alone standing could be denied)0 8 which would justify an intrusion into
what the court believed to be solely the domain of the Attorney General.
The Tenth Circuit focused on the finding of the district court that there
would be significant economic detriment to the postal employees if com-
petition were to continue. 69 Both courts' consideration of standing may
have been shaped by their respective perceptions of the harm involved.
Whatever the reason for the contrary results, the Supreme Court
must face the basic issue in the cases - the right of the postal employees
to challenge the intrusion of the Independent Postal System into the
postal business. The Court can resolve this issue by either responding
to the standing question, or by deciding that no private right of action
exists under the postal statutes. The former approach could result in an
opinion of broad application, either restricting or expanding the doctrine
of standing. The latter approach would result in an opinion more limited
in scope, concerning only the right of postal employees to sue under the
postal statutes. The Court will likely pursue this private right of action
course, as it did in Potomac Passengers, and leave the circuit courts further
time to thrash out this "complicated specialty of federal jurisdiction."
Michael S. Burg
68. 481 F.2d at 92.
69. 470 F.2d at 270.
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